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This paper examines the long-term electoral and welfare consequences of repeated strategies 
whereby a political office-holder induces cycles in economic variables to maximize his chances of 
re-election. Unlike other studies of political business cycles, we focus on questions of the 
desirability of these cyclical patterns and on the long-run properties of these political economic 
models. Noting that the welfare costs of vote maximizing in a single term extend beyond that 
term, we examine in detail the properties of the 'long-run equilibrium path' to which such cycles 
converge. If the economy starts above this path, vote maximizing can lead to increased social 
welfare and vote margins. However, if the economy starts below this path, vote-maximizing in 
the present can cause reduced votes and electoral defeat in subsequent terms. This possibility 
should lead a far-sighted, enlightened politician or political party to eschew vote-maximizing 
tactics and the political business cycles which accompany them and thus can help explain why 
empirical studies have not found convincing evidence of the existence of such cycles. This paper 
also quantifies the dependence of this long-run equilibrium path on the important political and 
economic parameters of the model. 
1. Introduction 
An elected official has to reconcile a number of different objectives as he 
carries out the duties of his office. These objectives may include the general 
welfare of society, the welfare of various social and economic groups, the 
electoral success of his party, and his own re-election. A central question in 
the study of representative government is how politicians reconcile these 
possibly conflicting goals, and what the consequences of alternative strategies 
are. 
In this paper we will examine in detail a model of a special case of this 
problem. We will present conceptualizations of general social welfare and of 
votes as similar but distinct functions of economic variables under the 
control of an elected official. Our purpose is to assess the consequences of a 
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strategy of maximizing votes in the next election on subsequent re-election 
prospects and on social welfare. 
In the model we examine, the politician who chooses to maximize votes 
introduces cyclical patterns in inflation and unemployment with phases 
determined by the periods between elections. The possibility that political 
motivations might generate cyclical patterns in economic variables has been 
suggested by a number of recent authors, and it has been widely discussed in 
recent economics and political science literature. Most of this literature has 
been empirical, focusing on the question of whether such 'political business 
cycles' exist. 1 
More theoretical questions such as that of the desirability of the cyclical 
patterns and the long-run properties of these political economic models have 
received relatively little attention since Nordhaus (1975) presented the basic 
modern formulation of the rationale behind political business cycles. 2 Nord- 
haus suggested that vote-maximizing may involve welfare costs for society as 
a whole. We will show that while this may be the case, it is not the whole 
story even within his model. For example, under certain circumstances, 
policies chosen to maximize the probability of re-election may actually 
improve social welfare. Moreover, in the more likely situation that such 
strategies cause welfare loss, the costs of such behavior are limited in two 
ways. The welfare loss possibilities may be bounded by a long-run equilib- 
rium path; and whether or not they are so bounded, long-run deterioration 
in social welfare will lead to long-run deterioration in electoral prospects. In 
this case, a rational and farsighted politician may disdain the political 
business cycles which are induced by short-run vote maximizing since such 
cycles may eventually make re-election impossible. Vote maximizing may be 
at odds with welfare maximizing in the short run in this model, but it cannot 
lead to an indefinitely increasing welfare loss. 
Although the Nordhaus model is only one of several ways in which 
political motivations can induce cyclic patterns in economic variables, it will 
be our vehicle of analysis for several reasons. It is the most theoretically 
sophisticated and mathematically elegant model of the possibility of a 
conflict between political incentives and public well-being. Among its 
achievements are the conceptualization of distinct voting and welfare func- 
tions that can be optimized subject to economic constraints, and a math- 
ematical solution to the problem of choosing the time-path of a political 
control variable that maximizes votes. Yet while Nordhaus provides a basis 
INordhaus (1957), Tufte (1978) and Maloney and Smirlock (1981) find evidence supportive of 
the standard political business cycle hypothesis. McCallum (1978), Golden and Poterba (1980), 
Beck (1982) and Monroe (1983) produce evidence which is not supportive. Paldam (1979, 1981) 
finds cyclical patterns that follow electoral periods, but they do not follow the patterns predicted 
by the theory we are considering here, and he presents an alternative explanation. 
2See, however, Lindbeck (1976), and Tufte (1978). 
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for the analysis of the welfare consequences of selfish and narrow political 
motivation, his own answer to this question is, as we will show, unsatis- 
factory and incomplete. 
2. The Nordhaus model 
Nordhaus (1975) conceptualizes both votes and welfare as functions of 
inflation, n, and unemployment, u, each of which is a 'bad' to be avoided. In 
fact, for any fixed moment of time, he takes the aggregate voting function 
g(u, n) as a reasonable candidate for a social welfare function. He distingu- 
ishes between the voting and welfare functions, not by the sign on inflation 
or unemployment or even by the marginal rate of substitution between them, 
but by the time period over which they are evaluated and the method of 
weighting different times within those periods. Welfare is evaluated across 
infinite time and is discounted at a rate, p, in order to weigh present welfare 
more heavily than future welfare. On the other hand, votes are evaluated 
across finite electoral periods, and time is discounted backwards rather than 
forwards, in order to model the fact that voters seem to weigh the recent past 
more heavily than the distant past in their evaluation of incumbent admini- 
strations. While such a voting function is too simple to represent the state of 
the art in empirical work, its basic features are compatible with that work, 
which indicates that voters are influenced by a retrospective evaluation of the 
economic performance of the incumbent administration in which they weigh 
the recent past more heavily than the earlier part of the present term? 
Thus, while the Nordhaus welfare and vote functions are simplifications of 
reality, they represent well one possible disjuncture between political goals 
and public well-being. In their general form, the functions are: 
O0 
W= ~ g(u,n)e-Ptdt, (1) 
0 
0 
V= j g(u,~)e~ dt, (2) 
0 
where W stands for social welfare, V for aggregate votes, 0 for the length of 
the electoral period,/~ for the rate of decay of voters' memories, and g(u, 70 is 
an aggregate, instantaneous voting function. 
To complete this model, Nordhaus includes the now familiar intertemporal 
interdependence between u and 7r, modeled as an expectational Phillips curve; 
i.e., inflation is a decreasing function of unemployment and an increasing 
function of expected inflation: 
rc=f(u)+Av, f'(u) <0, (3) 
3 See, for example, Fair (1978), Hibbs (1982) and Kramer (1971). 
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v), (4) 
where v is expected inflation, ~ represents the speed of adjustment of expected 
inflation, and )~ measures the impact of expected inflation on actual inflation 
(0_<4< 1). Unemployment, the control variable, can affect inflation directly 
(~Tr/3u<0) and indirectly (through t~ when ~=~v). The indirect component 
takes time, as indicated by (4), and as a result the full inflationary or 
deflationary consequences of present policy may be delayed. For example, 
unsustainably low combinations of unemployment and inflation at election 
time can be created by deflation early in the electoral term and may lead to 
higher inflation for subsequent terms. 
The central feature of the Nordhaus model is that politicians might 
manipulate the timing of economic outcomes to maximize their vote at the 
next election. Since the vote function and the welfare function are different, 
such behavior can lead to less than maximal social welfare. 
3. The limitations of Nordhaus's answer to the welfare consequences question 
Nordhaus's own provocative answer to the question of the welfare 
consequences of political business cycles is that: 
'under conditions where voting is an appropriate mechanism for social 
choice, democratic systems will choose a policy on the long-run trade-off 
[between inflation and unemployment] that has lower unemployment 
and higher inflation than is optimal.' [Nordhaus (1975, p. 178).] 
Along with the rationale for the existence of a politically-induced business 
cycle, it is this principle which subsequent analysts regard as the major 
conclusion of Nordhaus's analysis. 4 We find this conclusion unsatisfactory 
for a number of reasons: it is the answer to the wrong mathematical 
question; it is not necessarily correct; and it fails to distinguish between 
welfare costs within a term in which votes are maximized and the costs of 
such maximization in subsequent terms. 
Nordhaus derives his conclusion through a consideration of the problem 
of maximizing the welfare function (1) subject to economic constraints (3) 
and (4). Without providing any motivation for doing so, he asks only what 
the system would look like in equilibrium, when all time derivatives are 
equal to zero. There is no reason to assume that the system will reach such 
an equilibrium. 
Nordhaus finds that when it 'does', 'the democratic outcome corresponds 
to the policy which was found ... to be purely myopic' (1975, p. 179), i.e., 
where p=oo in (1). He shows that such an equilibrium point has more 
4See, for example, Frey and Ramser (1976), L/~chler (1978), MacRae (1977) and Keech (1980). 
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inflation and less unemployment than does the social welfare maximizing 
equilibrium corresponding to a finite p. 
However, in the next section of this article, Nordhaus (1975, p. 182), 
introduces what he considers 'a more realistic continuous model', in which he 
uses the vote function (2) and the memory parameter #. Once again he uses 
dynamic optimization techniques. However, this time he does not settle for 
the undefended static equilibrium solution, but rather uses the usual trans- 
versality conditions of control theory to derive a dynamic solution in which 
the policy-maker sets unemployment at a high level at the beginning of his 
term and lets it drop monotonically during the term. 
Having introduced and worked with this much more realistic model in 
which he carefully and appropriately uses the techniques of optimal control 
theory, Nordhaus does not go back to examine how his conclusion about 
welfare consequences would fit into this more relevant dynamic model. Nor 
does he attempt to relate the political business cycle paths in his dynamic 
model to the unmotivated steady-state analysis which he used to derive his 
optimality conclusion. 
We show in appendix D that when one works with the more realistic 
dynamic 'business cycle' paths, Nordhaus's principle need not hold. Specifi- 
cally, we provide an example in Nordhaus's own framework which shows 
that for certain parameter values each point along a sequence of vote- 
maximizing paths computed using Nordhaus's more dynamic solution, can 
have more social welfare than the steady state welfare maximizer upon which 
Nordhaus bases his principle. Furthermore, the inflation rate is lower on the 
vote-maximizing path than it is at the welfare-maximizing steady state. In the 
remainder of this paper, we use the more realistic dynamic model to examine 
the long-run consequences of vote-maximizing strategies both on the re- 
election chances of the office holder and on the welfare of society as a whole. 
4. Analyzing the welfare consequences of vote maximizing with Nordhaus 
model 
A first cut at measuring the welfare consequences of vote maximizing 
might involve assessment of a single term. To do so, one can evaluate both 
integrals in (1) and (2) from 0 to 0, i.e., over a single electoral period. In this 
case, (1) and (2) will differ only in their weighting parameters, - p  and #. 
Assuming that p is small over a single electoral period, one finds that the 
welfare costs in that period depend heavily on /4  the parameter representing 
voters' forgetfulness. Forgetful or present-oriented voters can permit early 
term high unemployment, which is costly to welfare but can actually enhance 
the vote for incumbents. Empirical studies by Hibbs (1982) and Fair (1978) 
suggest that # is quite large, certainly large enough to permit a substantial 
cycle and substantial welfare loss if such a cycle were economically possible 
and if politicians thought they could get away with it. 
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However, the welfare costs of vote maximizing in a single term may extend 
beyond that term. For example, low terminal values of unemployment may 
create inflationary expectations in the next term. Even if the incumbent 
maximized welfare instead of votes in the next term, the feasible values of 
welfare might be reduced because of the residue of inflationary expectations 
from the vote maximizing in the previous term. 
Thus the welfare costs of vote maximizing in any single term must take 
into account the effects on welfare in subsequent terms, even if votes are not 
maximized repeatedly term after term. Since the costs within any term in 
which votes are maximized are so heavily dependent on the size of #, the 
subtler question regards the spillover of residual costs onto the next term. 
Accordingly, our method of assessing welfare consequences will focus on the 
consequences after a term in which votes are maximized. These effects are 
especially important because they are the ones that cannot be eliminated 
simply by changing the political decision rule in the next term and 
maximizing welfare. These delayed costs represent both the nature of any 
trends associated with repeated vote maximizing, and the residual problems 
that past vote maximiTers leave for subsequent welfare maximizers. 5 
5. Lasting consequences of pofiticaHy induced business cycles 
Recall that Nordhaus's dynamic model involved maximizing an aggregate 
voting function V as in (2) with the economic variables constrained by the 
expectational Phillips curve eqs. (3) and (4). Since expected inflation, v, is the 
state variable in this model, the one variable which politicians cannot 
directly control, one can uniquely determine a solution to this control theory 
problem once one sets the initial value of expected inflation, v(0). 6 The 
solution will include optimal values of u(t), ~t)  and v(t) for 0 < t _  0. 
In studying long-run behavior, it is natural to assume that the initial 
expected inflation v2(0) for the second term equals the terminal value of 
expected inflation vl(O) for the first term. In other words, we assume that the 
state variable v(t) varies continuously over time - -  even during changes in 
SNote that our method of assessing welfare consequences of vote maximizing is not dependent 
on any assumption that all politicians maximiTe votes, or that any politicians do so all the time. 
There are many reasons why vote maximizing may be undertaken only from time to time. 
Incumbents may do so only when they are insecure about their re-election prospects and expect 
to lose otherwise. Some incumbents may choose not to maximize votes because their ethics or 
their ideology prohibits doing so. Or incumbents may feel that they can 'fool' voters with this 
sort of manipulation of the timing of economic outcomes once, or maybe even occasionally, but 
not regularly, especially when the opposition party or the press can call voters' attention to a 
pattern. Or, as MacRae (1977) suggested, some administrations may think voters are too 
sophisticated or 'strategic' to allow such manipulation, and act accordingly. Our analysis shows 
the nature of the lasting consequences of either intermittent or regular vote maximizing. 
6We assume that f(u) and -g(u,~t) are concave in u so that standard existence theorems for 
solutions of optimal control problems apply. 
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administration. Thus, once we have determined the optimal u,(0, x,(0, and 
v,(0 for one term (the ith) and agree that v,(O)=vi+l(O) for the next term, 
optimal control theory then determines the optimal u~+l(0, n~+t(0, and 
vi+l(O (O<t<O) for the succeeding term. 
Our analysis of the long-run consequences of vote maximizing will be 
presented in terms of the difference, Di, between expected inflation at the 
beginning of term i and the end of term i, 
D, = v,( O) - v,(O). (5) 
When D is positive, there is a trend of welfare loss across the term, because 
inflation in the next term will be higher unless there is a compensating 
increase in unemployment. Similarly, when D is negative, there is a trend of 
welfare gain. When D is zero, there is no welfare trend, and all welfare costs 
of vote maximizing are felt within the term. In this case, v,(O)=v,(O)=vi+l(O). 
Since v,~0) determines the solution paths of our dynamic optimization 
problem, when D~=0, the optimal u(0, n(0, and v(0 paths for the ith term 
will also be the optimal paths for the (i+ 1)st term and for every term 
thereafter. Consequently, it  is natural to define a long-run equilibrium path 
(LREP) as one in which the optimal ui(t), ni(O, and vi(t) are independent of i. 
By the above discussion, such a path is characterized by D 1 =0. 
To understand the lasting welfare consequences of vote maximizing, we 
need to know the sign of D for any initial condition. We also need to know 
whether this sign stays the same after repeated terms of vote maximizing and 
whether there is convergence to a LREP, where D =0. If such a LREP exists, 
we need to know whether it is stable, so that if the system is disturbed in any 
direction, vote maximizing behavior will return it to the same equilibrium 
path. 
To keep the analysis straightforward, we will look at three basic cases in 
which we study special functional forms for f(u) and g(u, r0: (1) Nordhaus's 
quadratic-linear g with 2< 1, (2) the same g with 2= 1, and (3) MacRae's 
quadratic-quadr'atic g with 2 = 1. Our mathematical analysis will be presen- 
ted in the appendices and summarized in the text. The results will also be 
presented graphically in phase portraits in unemployment--expected inflation 
space, i.e., u - v  space. These diagrams show the movement of expected 
inflation that is associated with the vote-maximizing unemployment paths 
from any initial condition v,(0). In fact, the analysis in our phase portraits 
works for more general f(u) and g(u, n), so that most of our conclusions hold 
in the more general setting. 
We will show that Di has the same sign for all i and that the system tends 
to a stable LREP as i increases (except in one special case where n~ and v~ 
increase without bound). We will study the election and welfare results along 
the LREP and will describe how the LREP and its welfare values depend 
J.E.B.O.-- D 
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on the parameters of the problem, such as #, p, 2, and 0. At the end, we will 
summarize the implications of these analytical results on the electoral and 
welfare consequences of vote-maximizing strategies. 
5.1. Case one: Nordhaus" functional forms: 2 < 1 
We first address these questions for the special functional forms which 
Nordhaus uses in his paper: the linear Phillips curve function f ( u ) = ~ o - ~ l u  
in (3) and the quadratic-linear voting function g(u, n ) = - u  2-/~n in (2). As 
shown in Appendix A, when this quadratic-linear objective function is used, 
the vote-maximizing path of unemployment u(0 is independent of inflation 
and expected inflation. In particular, u(0) and u(O) depend only on the 
parameters of the model and not on the initial condition v(0). In terms of our 
phase diagrams in u - v  space, all unemployment paths start on the vertical 
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Fig. 1. Phase portraits for Nordhaus' functional forms. 
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The corresponding path of inflation depends both on v(0) and on the 
parameters of the model, especially the size of the coefficient 2 on expected 
inflation in (3). This coefficient determines the slope of the long-run Phillips 
curve, the set of points where inflation is equal to expected inflation and 
therefore stable. By (4), this curve has the equation ~---0. To its left, inflation 
is greater than expected inflation and the latter rises; to its right, the reverse 
holds and expected inflation falls. 
When 2<  1, as in fig. l(a), the long-run Phillips curve is a negatively 
sloped line which must cut through the u(0) to u(0) strip that defines the 
unemployment path. By the argument of the previous paragraph, political 
business cycle paths which start above the long-run Phillips curve will move 
down toward it, while paths which start below the long-run Phillips curve 
will move up toward it. There is always a unique LREP which crosses the 
long-run Phillips curve in the u(0) to u(O) strip and toward which all the 
vote-maximizing paths will tend. 7 
The same point can be made mathematically. A long-run equilibrium path 
of the control variable is one in which D in (5) is zero, or v(0)=v(0). As 
shown in appendix B for the situation under discussion, v(0) depends linearly 
on v(0), 
v(0) = e-  r(1 - ;t)0v(0) + C, (6) 
where C depends on all the parameters of the model except v(0). For 
0 < 2 < 1 ,  the slope of this line is e -m-x~°, which lies between 0 and 1. If one 
considers (6) as a linear difference equation for v(0), the fact that the slope 
lies between 0 and 1 means not only that there is a unique equilibrium but 
also that the process converges to this equilibrium from any starting point. 
Consequently, repeated terms of voting-maximizing politicians would send 
the economy converging toward a unique and well-defined long-run equilib- 
rium business cycle (LREP). This convergence becomes much more rapid as 
term length 0 gets longer, as the rate of adjustment of expected inflation 
gets larger, or as the coefficient 2 of expected inflation in (3) gets smaller. 
Under the circumstances of Case one, the trend of welfare consequences 
associated with vote maximizing depends on initial expected inflation. If that 
initial condition [i.e., the inherited rate of expected inflation, v(0)] is above 
the LREP, vote maximizing will lead to improving values of welfare across 
terms. The reverse is the case ff the initial condition is below. In either case, 
the equilibrium welfare value is that associated with the LREP. 
The long term re-election chances of the vote-maximizing incumbent 
depend on the position of the LREP relative to the level curve G of g which 
represents 50 percent of the vote. We have drawn the level curve G in fig. 
7Sinc~ ~0)=v(0) for a LREP, there exists a tl in (0,0) for which ~(tl)=0 by the mean value 
theorem. But (~ = 0) is the equation for the long-run Phillips curve. Hence, the LREP must cross 
the long-run Phillips curve in u - v  phase space. 
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l(c). We call the region below G the 're-election region'. If the L R E P  ends 
above the level curve G, i.e., outside the re-election region, term by term 
vote-maximizing strategies will eventually lead to a situation where re- 
election is impossible. In appendix B, we discuss in detail how the position 
of the L R E P  depends on the parameters of the problem. In summary, 
increases in Ctl, fl, y, # and 0 and decreases in Cto yield LREPs  which are 
closer to the origin in u - v  space and thus have a higher level of social 
welfare and a greater chance of falling within the re-election region. 
5.2. Case two: Nordhaus' functional forms: 2 = 1 
Macroeconomists of various theoretical persuasions suggest that 2 is very 
close to 1, if not identically 1, in inflation models for the contemporary era. 
As 2 approaches 1, the slope of the long-run Phillips curve becomes infinite, 
i.e., the curve becomes vertical. When Z= 1, the long-run Phillips curve is a 
vertical line which need not intersect the u(O)-u(O) strip. Then succeeding 
vote-maximizing paths move monotonically up or down in the strip as 
illustrated in figs. l(b) and l(c). 
This movement can also be seen analytically by examining the difference 
eq. (6). When 2=  1, the coefficient of v(0) becomes 1 and the difference 
equation is now a simple translation 
v(0) = v(0) + C, (7) 
which will move continually upwards or downwards depending on whether 
C is positive or negative. 
Given the functional form of Nordhaus' social welfare function (1) and 
voting function (2), sequences of business cycles which move upwards to + oo 
lead to lower and lower social welfare and to a decreasing percentage of 
votes for the vote maximizer, while the opposite occurs for sequences which 
move downward to - ~ .  However, Nordhaus imposes the constraint n > 0  
on his model (among other reasons) to avoid the situations where arbitrarily 
high rates of disinflation lead to arbitrarily high levels of social welfare. Since 
~r=~o-~lu+2v in Nordhaus' framework, business cycle paths cannot fall 
below the line 
O~o-Oqu + 2v=O (8) 
in u - v  phase portrait space. Thus, instead of going downward to v = - o o ,  
decreasing sequences of business cycles will pile up onto the line (8) as 
indicated in fig. l(b). The intersection of line (8) with the u(O)--u(O) strip 
becomes the long-run equilibrium path for this situation) 
SThis follows from the maximum principle of control theory or from Arrow's principle of 
blocked intervals. See, for example, Clark (1976). 
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Just as Nordhaus'  7c > 0 constraint limits the welfare gain, the existence of 
the 're-election region' implicitly bounds the welfare loss associated with vote 
maximizing when C is positive. Since the vote and welfare functions have the 
same arguments, successive cycles which include higher expected inflation 
will cause higher inflation and therefore fewer votes as well as less welfare. 
Once one of these increasing cycles ends outside the re-election region, the 
vote-maximizing incumbent will find himself in a position where the max- 
imum attainable number of votes will not be enough to win re-election. 
Ironically, vote maximizing in the present can cause reduced votes and 
electoral defeat in subsequent terms. This possibility should lead a far- 
sighted, enlightened politician or political party to eschew vote-maximizing 
tactics and the political business cycles which accompany them. 
Whether sequences of political business cycles move up beyond the re- 
election region or down to r~=0 when 2=  1 depends on the sign of the 
constant C in eq. (7). As appendix B explains, an increase in ~1, ]~, ~, #, or 0, 
or a decrease in ~o or in the natural rate of unemployment increases the 
likelihood that C will be negative and that welfare or votes will grow during 
successive political business cycles. Furthermore, the most important com- 
parison is that between the unemployment rate during the cycle and the 
natural rate of unemployment, ~o/~1. If the unemployment rate during most 
or all of the cycle stays above the natural rate, then successive cycles will lead 
to improved welfai:e and vote margins. On the other hand, if the vote- 
maximizing politician keeps the unemployment rate below the natural rate 
for all or most of his term, then successive cycles will lead to diminishing 
social welfare and vote margins. 
5.3. Case three: The fully quadratic voting function 
As indicated above, the quadratic-linear vote function makes the vote- 
maximizing path of unemployment independent of inflation and expected 
inflation. That is, no matter what the inflationary situation is, and no matter 
what the inflationary consequences are, the choice of the control will be 
exactly the same. This invariant path seems rather implausible from both a 
theoretical and a practical standpoint. 
The fully quadratic objective function g(u, n ) = -  u 2 -  fin 2 is more sensible 
theoretically, although it is less tractible mathematically. 9 The quadratic- 
linear form allowed dosed form solutions for the u, v and rc paths. In the 
fully quadratic case, the differential equations are still linear, as they were for 
the Nordhaus formulation. However, the eigenvalues for this linear system 
are complicated irrational expressions of the parameters of the problem, so a 
9A fully quadratic functional form is used by MacRae (1977), Maloney and Smirlock (1981), 
and ChappeU and Keech (1983). 
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closed form solution is no longer illuminating. Still, one can use phase 
portrait analysis in u - v  space to study the properties of the modified system, 
just as we did with Nordhaus' formulation. We carry out this analysis in 
appendix C and summarize its results here. 
The exact nature of the dynamics depends on the relative sizes of two of 
the parameters, ~ and #, as explained in appendix C, but the essential nature 
of the results is the same in each case. Accordingly, we have presented a 




9=O(LR Phillips Curve) 
Fig. 2. Phase portrait for fully quadratic objective function. 
In the fully quadratic case, the vote-maximizing path of the control 
variable, u*(0, is still a decreasing function of t for 0 <  t_< 0, which means 
that politically induced business cycles still exist with this objective function. 
However, as indicated in our stylized fig. 2, the initial and terminal values of 
unemployment are no longer invariant with respect to expected inflation, as 
they were in fig. 1, which represented the quadratic-linear case. Now, the t = 0 
and t=0  lines are positively sloped in u - v  space, implying that higher 
values of unemployment will be chosen when expected inflation is high. That 
is, the optimal unemployment path compensates for high inflationary expect- 
ations, and is chosen to bring them down towards more desirable values of 
the objective functions. This formulation makes more sense theoretically than 
the quadratic-linear alternative, which implies that an optimal unemploy- 
ment path can cause inflation but is insensitive to it, even though inflation is 
an argument in the objective function being optimized. 
There is a unique long-run equilibrium path for the fully quadratic objective 
function for any choice of economic and political parameters. Any sequence 
of cycles which satisfies our natural continuity assumption, vi+l(O)=v,(O), 
will tend to this LREP as i increases, i.e., the L R E P  is 'globally stable'. 
For the rest of this analysis, we will work with the widely accepted hypo- 
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thesis that 2=  1. Even in this case, the vertical long-run Phillips curve will 
still cross the u(0) to u(O) region and a unique finite LREP will exist. 1° 
The lasting consequences of vote maximizing now depend on the initial 
values of expected inflation. If the initial condition lies above the LREP, 
then D t is negative and the successive cycles will move downward to that 
path, with voter support and social welfare increasing as the sequence 
progresses. If the initial position lies below the LREP, then Di is positive, 
and the successive cycles will move upward to that path, with votes and 
welfare decreasing. 
The position of the LREP now becomes critical. If it lies in the re-election 
region under the 50 percent contour, then repeated vote maximizers may still 
be able to retain their office. However, if the economy is initially below the 
LREP, decreasing vote margins and loss of social welfare could lead voters 
and candidates to reject the mechanisms of the political business cycle. If the 
LREP lies beyond the 50 percent vote contour, then we have the same 
situation as we had when the business cycles marched to infinity in the 
Nordhaus formulation. Officeholders will eventually be unable to retain their 
offices if they continue to maximize votes term by term, and if the 50 percent 
vote contour remains fixed. This fact, together with the diminished social 
welfare of the voters, should lead to a discontinuation of the vote-maximizing 
techniques that lead to political business cycles. The system may become self- 
defeating in its own terms. 
As before, the question of how the economic and political parameters 
affect the location of the LREP is an important issue. As derived in 
appendix C, the comparative statics are similar to those for Nordhaus' 
original formulation. Increases in ~t, t ,  #, or 0 or a decrease in ~o yield 
LREPs with higher welfare levels and vote margins. Once again, the higher 
the natural rate of unemployment, the more likely it is that successive 
business cycles will lead to shrinking vote margins and welfare levels. ~ ~ 
6. Conclusion 
We have found that repeated vote maximizing leads to two kinds of 
welfare possibilities and to two kinds of political possibilities. The critical 
concept is the long-run equilibrium path (LREP) and its position relative to 
1°In fact, v(0) is still a linear function of v(0) as in (6); its slope always lies between 0 and 1. 
llAs the analysis in appendix C indicates, the conclusions of this section hold for much more 
general voting functions g(u, v) and inflation-unemployment relationships f(u). In general, the 
optimal u(t) will be a decreasing function of t for 0<t_<0; its values will depend on the initial 
condition v(0). Either the business cycles will march off to oo in u - v  space for successive 
administrations, or (more likely) there will exist at least one LREP and each sequence of 
business cycles satisfying vi+l(O)fv~O) will tend to some LREP. The long-run welfare 
consequences of vote maximization in this context will depend heavily on the position of the 
LREP relative to the 50 percent isoquant of the vote function, as described earlier in this 
section. 
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the 50 percent vote isoquant, or re-election line. We showed that in general 
stable LREPs  exist, possibly at infinity. In the cases we examined, the L R E P  
was unique and the sequence of business cycles converged monotonically 
toward it. 
The two kinds of welfare possibilities depend on whether the initial 
condition is above or below the LREP in unemployment-expected inflation 
space. If it is above, repeated vote maximizing leads to successive welfare 
improvements. If it is below, such a process leads to successive welfare losses. 
In either case, the LREP represents a stable equilibrium with identifiable 
welfare and political properties. 
Whether repeated vote maximizing reaches the L R E P  depends on the 
location of that path relative to the re-election line. If the path is below that 
line, vote maximizing can be compatible with repeated re-election whether it 
is associated with welfare improvements or welfare losses. If the L R E P  is 
beyond that line, repeated vote maximizing will sooner or later lead to the 
ironic situation in which maximizing votes will not secure re-election. 
Our comparative statics analysis indicates that the L R E P  is more likely to 
lie outside the re-election region: the higher the natural rate of unemploy- 
ment, the better voters' memories, the shorter the electoral term length, and 
the greater the weight that voters give to unemployment relative to inflation. 
Furthermore, the longer a vote-maximizing politician keeps the unemploy- 
ment rate below the natural rate, the greater are the chances that his strategy 
will lead to diminishing social welfare and vote margins across terms. 
The Nordhaus model has conceptualized a way to assess the welfare 
consequences of narrow political motivation. Politicians are assumed to have 
a great deal of control over the economy, and therefore over votes and 
welfare. While welfare is defined basically in terms of what voters want, the 
basis for the disjuncture between what brings votes and what brings welfare 
is a failure to understand the intertemporal interdependence of inflation and 
unemployment, and/or a failure to take a long view. 
We have shown that in a world so described there are inherent limits on 
the welfare loss associated with vote maximizing strategies. There are 
circumstances in which such strategies actually increase social welfare. But 
even when they lead to welfare losses, the 50 percent vote isoquant provides 
a natural bound so that at worst, repeated vote maximizing will lead to 
declining votes across terms and finally to repeated defeats of newly elected 
incumbents. Thus the worst welfare possibilities are associated with the worst 
political possibilities. 
Recognition of this fact may lead farsighted politicians to eschew term by 
term vote maximizing because they anticipate its political as well as welfare 
costs. Indeed this may help explain the failure of many investigators to find 
evidence of political business cycles. 12 Repeated vote maximizing may not 
12See footnote 1. 
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maximize welfare as if guided by an invisible hand, but there are limits on 
the amount of damage it can do. 
Appendix A: Nordhaus' formulation of the political business cycle model 
Nordhaus (1975) uses a linear Phillips curve, f (u)=ao-CtxU,  in (3) and. a 
quadratic-linear voting function in (1) and (2), g(u, n ) = - u  2- f in ,  where Cto,. 
cq, and f are positive constants. After applying the maximum principle to 
the problem of maximizing (2) subject to (3) and (4), he arrives at the linear 
system of differential equations, 
fi = Au + B, (A.la) 
t 3=7{ao-a lu - (1 - -2 )v} ,  (A.lb) 
with boundary conditions: o(0)=Vo and u(O)=½axf. Here, 
A - ? ( 1 - - 2 ) - 2 ,  B -  --½all(),-/.t), (A.2) 
where/~ is the parameter measuring voters' memory in (2) and 3' is the rate of 
adjustment of expected inflation to discrepancies between actual and ex- 
pected inflation in (4). Since (A.1) is a linear equation in u alone, one can 
easily solve it and its boundary condition to obtain the optimal unemploy- 
ment rate, 
u*(t) =(~Zlfl + B / A ) e x p [ A ( t - O ) ] -  B/A. (A.3) 
Note that u*(t) is independent of v(0). Now, plug (A.3) into (A.1) to find the 
corresponding 
v*(t) = G - F e a(t- 0) + {Vo - G + F e - as} e - r(t - ~t)t, where (A.4) 
G=(ao + ~tt(B/A))/(1 -- 2), 
F - ctx?(x2-axfl + B/A)/[2?(1 -- 2 ) -  #3. 
(A.5) 
Phase portraits of the system (A.1) in u - v  space can often give more 
geometric information about the behavior of the system. There are basically 
two distinct phase portraits, depending on the signs of the constants A and B 
in (11). We have drawn these two portraits in figs. 3 and 4: one for A < 0  and 
B < 0 and one for A > 0 and B < 0. The portrait  for A < 0 and B < 0 is similar 
to the former except that the {ti=0}-line lies to the left of the v-axis. The 
situation A > 0 and B > 0 cannot occur. 
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{O:O} u(O) u(O) 
Fig. 3. Phase portrait of (A.1) for A < 0  and B>0.  
0 I a~B2 B 
A 
u(O) u(O) {o:o} 
Fig. 4. Phase portrait of (A.1) for A > 0  and B<0.  
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There are four important lines in each of these portraits: (1) the vertical 
{ti=0} line which occurs at {u= - B / A }  and is an orbit of (A.1), (2) the vertical 
u(0)-line which occurs at u=½~lfl and on which all business cycles must end, 
(3) the vertical u(0)-line which by (A.3) occurs at 
u(O) = (~Xlfl + B/A) e - a ° -  B /A  (A.6) 
and on which all business cycles begin, and (4) the negatively sloped {l)=0}- 
line whose equation by (A.lb) is 
~ lu+y(1 -2 )V=~o ,  (A.7) 
and whose slope is - ~ 1 / ( 1 - 2 ) .  On this last line, which is drawn as a dashed 
line in the figures, the dynamical system is horizontal. We have also drawn in 
some typical solution curves. The thicker ones between the u(0)- and u(O)- 
lines are examples of political business cycles. 
Appendix B: The existence and locations of LREPs in Nordhaus' model 
To study long-run behavior, one first needs to know how v(0) depends on 
v(0), recalling that this v(0) will be the new v(0) for the next term. By 
plugging t = 0 into (A.4), one obtains 
v(0) = e  -~(1-x)°v(0) + C1, where (B.1) 
C 1 =-6;(1--e-r(1-~)°)--F(1--e-(A+r"-~))°) 
does not depend on v(0). Eq. (B.1) is a linear difference equation for v(0) with 
the coefficient of v(0) a constant between 0 and 1. Therefore, iteration of this 
difference equation with vi+l(O)=v,(O) and vl(0) arbitrary will always con- 
verge to its unique steady state solution 
v( O) = v(O)= C1/(1 - e  -~(1 - ~)o) 
= G -  F(1 - e  -cA +~" - ~))o)(1 - e  -~'{1 - ~.)o) - 1, (B.2) 
where F and 6; are the constants defined in (A.5). 
Having seen that a unique L R E P  exists, we next determine how its 
location depends on the economic and political parameters of this model 
(e.g., ~o, ~1, P, Y, 2, #, 0). The direct method for such a study would be to 
differentiate (B.2) with respect to each of these parameters. Because of the 
complexity of (B.2), this method is very unwieldy and provides little insight. 
Instead, we will see how changes in these parameters affect the four principal 
lines in the phase portraits of figs. 3 and 4. 




/ /  
Fig. 5. Level set of Nordhaus' vote/welfare function. 
Recall that Nordhaus '  vote/welfare function is 
~(u, v ) -  g(u, ~ o -  ~ u  + 2v) = - u 2 - / ~ ( ~ o -  ~ u  + iv). 
Its level curves are parabolae, each of whose maximum is on the line u =~-0qfl. 
(See fig. 5.) Since this is also the u(0)-line, all business cycles will lie to the 
right of this line. Consequently, if a business cycle such as a LREP moves 
up or to the right, the new path will have lower levels of welfare. Conversely, 
if such a cycle moves down or to the left, welfare will increase. 
Recall that, by our discussion in the text, the LREP crosses the {~ = 0}-line 
in the u(O)-u(O) strip, beginning and ending at the same v-level. If, for 
example, the u(0)- or u(0)-line moves to the right, the LREP would have to 
move down. We first rewrite (A.6) as 
u(O)= 2-~x~fly2Ok(AO) +~xtfl, (B.3) 
where k(x)=-(1-e-~)/x is the function which played a major role in the 
analysis in Keech and Simon (1983). One checks easily that k is always 
positive, k' is always negative, and that 
k(x) + k '(x)x=e-~> O. (B.4) 
An increase in #, 0, or y will affect the u(0)-line but not the u(0)- or the {0 = 0}- 
lines. Using (B.3), one checks 
a(u(O))/O~t= 21~oqflT~O2~(AO)( - 1) >0,  
O(u(O))/aO=~fly2[k(AO)+ AOk'(AO)]>O by (B.4), 
a(u(O))/c~y =~fl20[k(AO) + yOk'(AO)(1 - 2)1 
which is positive at least for 2 in the realistic range near 1. Consequently, if 
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#, 0, or ? increase, the u(0)-line moves to the right and therefore the LREP 
moves down (into a region of higher votes and higher social welfare). If cq or 
fl increases, a similar analysis shows that both the u(0)-and u(0)-line move to 
the right and so that LREP moves down. In the case of the increase of ctl, 
the move is accentuated by an increase in the steepness of the {fi = 0}-line. If 
=o increases, the {t~=0} is the only line affected. It moves upwards, bringing 
the LREP up with it. Since ~to/~t 1 is analogous to the natural rate of 
unemployment in this model, we see that decreases in this rate lead to a 
lower (and more preferred) LREP. 
As mentioned in the text, it is natural to set coefficient 2 of expected 
inflation in the unemployment-inflation function in (3) equal to 1. When this 
occurs, the {t~=0}-line in figs. 3 and 4 (i.e., the long-run Phillips curve) 
becomes a vertical line which crosses the u-axis at the 'natural rate of 
unemployment', ct0/c q. Ironically, there is now a wider diversity of phase 
portraits, depending on (1) the sign of B in (A.2), (2) the sign of B/#-Cto/~t, 
and (3) the location of the u(O)-u(O) strip, e.g., 2~1fl, relative to ~o/~q. We 
have drawn two of the phase portraits corresponding to B > 0 in figs. 6 and 7. 
To study long-run behavior for 2 = 1, we first need to find the optimal v*(t) 
and then plug in t = 0 to obtain a difference equation for v(0) in terms of v(0). 




B>0,  ,~= 1, B/#<~o/'q <~1~. 





u(O) u(O) ~)=0 
2 
B>0,  2=  1, B/#<-~tfl<%/el. 
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Straightforward calculations yield 
v(O)=v(O)+C2, where (B.5) 
c 2  - B ig )  + n/g)((1  - e"°)/g0)].  (B.6) 
This difference equation for v(0) is a simple translation which marches off to 
+oo if C2>0 and to - ~  if C2<0. (In the unlikely case that C2 is 
identically zero, then every business cycle is a LREP; an unstable 'knife-edge' 
situation which can be destroyed by any change in the parameters.) As we 
mention in the text, Nordhaus adds the constraint ' n>0 '  to avoid the 
situation where high levels of disinflation lead to high levels of social welfare. 
As a result, a decreasing sequence of business cycles for 2 = 1 will not drop to 
- ~  but will level off on the line rr=tXo-Oqu+2v=O. 
To complete the welfare study of Nordhaus' model when 2 = 1, we need to 
know what values of the parameters lead to the (ideal) situation of C2 <0 
where decreasing sequences of cycles lead to increases in vote margins and in 
social welfare and what values lead to the (self-destructing) situation of 
C2 > 0 where increasing sequences of cycles lead to decreases in vote margins 
and in social welfare. 
Once again, there are two approaches. We can work with the analytic 
expression (B.6) and find sufficient conditions on the parameters that lead to 
positive or negative C2. One checks easily that 
½glfl-B/#>O and (1-e~'°)/g0<0, 
so the sign of C2 depends on the sign and size of (~to# q -B/g). Alternatively, 
we can work with the phase diagrams as we did earlier in the appendix for 
2 < 1. Either method yields the following two conditions: if 
o~ol~l<½~q~=u(O) then C2<0, if 
"o/"1 > ½0qfl(1 + ?O((e ~° -  1)/g0)) = u(O) then C2>0. 
(B.7) 
One can draw two types of conclusions from conditions (B.7). First, the 
comparative statics are similar to those described above for 2<  1. Increases 
in ~q, fl, ?, #, or 0 or a decrease in 0t o increase the likelihood that Cz will be 
negative and that welfare and votes will grow during successive political 
business cycles. Second, the most important comparison is that between the 
unemployment rate during the cycles and the natural unemployment rate 
Cto/0t 1. If the unemployment rate during most or all the cycle stays above the 
natural rate, then successive cycles will lead to improved welfare and vote 
margins. On the other hand, if the vote-maximizing politician keeps the 
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unemployment rate below the natural rate for all or most of his term, then 
successive cycles will lead to diminishing social welfare and vote margins and 
eventually to a no-win situation. 
Appendix C: Analysis with a pure quadratic vote function 
In this appendix, we will study the problem of maximizing (2) subject to 
(3) and (4) with the vote function in (2) a pure quadratic, 
z 
Applying the maximum principle of optimal control theory just as Nordhaus 
(1975) did, we find that the optimal paths u(t) and v(t) must satisfy the linear 
system 
fi = A u -  K 2 [ A  + y J v -  aoAK,  
~i = -- a D ' u -  y(1 - 2)v + :toy , 
(C.1) 
where A is still ( 1 - 2 ) y - / ~  and K = a ~ f l / ( 1  +a2fl). The transversality condition 
~b(0) = 0 becomes 
u( O) - K ~ O) = aoK.  (c.2) 
One notices from (C.2) that u(O) now depends on v(0) and therefore on v(0), 
unlike the situation for Nordhaus' vote function. 
To keep the mathematics tractable, we will restrict ourselves to the case 
2 =  1 for the rest of this appendix. The system (C.1) now becomes 
fi = - l a # -  K E y -  # ] v  + go#K, 
fJ = --  ot ~ yu + ~oY. 
(C.3) 
There are three different phase portraits, depending on whether y - / z  is positive, 
zero, or negative. We have drawn two of these portraits in figs. 8 and 9. 
There are three important lines in each figure: (1) the line {ti=0} whose 
u-intercept is aoK and whose slope is /z/K(/z-7) , (2) the vertical line 
{~=0}, whose u-intercept is ~to/al, and (3) the {t=0}-line give by (C.2), 
whose u-intercept is also ctoK and whose slope is l / K > 0 .  Note that 
0 < aoK < ao/~l. 
The business cycle trajectory [solution to (C.1) and (C.2)] must end on the 
{t = 0}-line in each of these portraits and must satisfy v(0) > 0 by (C.2). To find 
the solution for a given v(0), find the trajectory in the proper phase portrait 
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~=o 
yc-fi 
(t =e} / 
v ~=0 
l.~~ {t=°} 
Fig. 8. System (C.3) with y>#.  
{t =e', 
{~=_, 
Fig. 9. System (C.3) with ~ < ~. 
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which starts on the horizontal line v=v(0), which ends on the {t=O}-line 
in the positive quadrant, and which takes exactly 0 units of time to make this 
trip. One notices that fi(0)<0 for such a trajectory and that, except for 
some situations with very large 0 and large v(0) in the 7 < # case (fig. 10), the 
solution will have ti(t)< 0 for all t between 0 and 0, just  as in the Nordhaus 
formulation. 
We now focus on the existence and location of LREP's for this model. By 
the linearity in eqs. (C.2) and (C.3) and by the general fundamental theory of 
linear systems of differential equations with constant coefficients, one can 
show easily that v(0) is still a linear function of v(0), 
v(O) = clv(O) + c2. (C.4) 
Furthermore, one can use figs. 8 and 9 to see that cl lies between 0 and 1. 
For, if v(0) is large positive, most of the business cycle will be in the t~ < 0  
region and v(0)< v(0). On the other hand, if v(0) is large negative, v(0) will be 
>v(0). This implies that there is a v(0) in between for which v(0)=v(0) and 
also that 0 < c 1 < 1  in (C.4). Consequently, just as in the Nordhaus formu- 
lation for 2 < 1, there is a unique LREP and any sequence of business cycles 
[solutions of (C.1) and (C.2)] which satisfies vi+l(O)=v,(O) will tend toward 
this LREP as i increases. 
Finally, we would like to describe the sensitivity of the LREP to changes 
in the parameters of the model. Recall that the LREP must cross the {t~ = 0}- 
line and thus must terminate on that segment of the {t= 0}-line which lies 
above the u-axis and to the left of the {~ = 0}-line. Consequently, the LREP 
must lie in the regions which are shaded in figs. 8 and 9. If 0 increases, so 
that one spends more time o n  the solution curve, then the LREP drops in all 
three cases - -  closer to the saddle equilibrium in fig. 8 and further from the 
sink equilibrium in fig. 9. If ~t o increases, all the lines move to the right; the 
shaded region and the LREP will also move to the fight to lower welfare 
levels. If ctt increases, the {~=0}-line will move to the left and so will the 
{t = 0}-line for realistic values of aq and fl (i.e., ~2fl2 > 1). As a result, the LREP 
will move down to a higher level of welfare. Putting these effects together, we 
find that a rise in the natural rate of unemployment (~to/~q) will entail a 
higher LREP. In other words, just as in the Nordhaus  formulation, the 
higher the natural rate the more likely it is that continued business cycles 
will lead to shrinking vote margins and welfare levels. 
If fl, the weight on inflation in the vote and welfare function, increases, 
then K increases and the {t=O}-line swings to the right. If # increases and 
becomes > 7, the {zi = 0}-line will turn clockwise about  (atoK, 0) in fig. 9. Both 
of these effects will move the shaded regions and presumably the LREPs 
down to higher welfare levels. Finally, increases in 7 (especially once 7 >/z) 
appear to have no effect on the LREP. 
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One can use the special case where # = ?  to illustrate more dearly the 
results in this appendix. With a little analysis, one can find tractable analytic 
solutions to (C.1) for this case. In particular, 
v(O) = clv(O) + c2, wher6 (C.5) 
cl = [1 + ~lyKO((e ~'°- 1)/#0)] - l, (C.6) 
c2 = OtoYO1/(1 + ot2 fl). (C.7) 
Note that 0 < ct < 1 and that  the initial v(0) for the L R E P  satisfies 
v'(O) = (tXo/~2fl)(#O/(e ~° -  1). (c.8) 
In this form, it is straightforward to check that an increase in ctl, fl, #, or 0 
or a decrease in ~o will bring v(0) (and hence the LREP) down to a higher 
level of votes and welfare. 
Appendix D: A LREP can have more welfare than Nordhaus' long-run welfare 
maximizer 
In section 3 of his paper, Nordhaus (1975, p. 175) asked: 'In the absence of 
political constraints what are the optimal levels of unemployment and 
inflation?' He chose as his solution the steady state maximizer of (1) subject 
to the macroeconomic constraints (3) and (4). In the notation of (1), (3), (4), 
this steady state satisfies 
f'(u)/(1 - 2) = --(p + y(1 - 2)/(p + y)(1 - 2))(bg/au)/(ag/blr) (D.1) 
and lies on the long-run Phillips curve. So that we can continue our analysis 
of the previous appendices, we will work in u - v  space instead of u - n  space. 
Fig. 10 shows the level sets of g (as in fig. 5) and the long-runPhil l ips curve 
(LRPC). Point Po, where the L R P C  is tangent to a level set, represents the 
'gold-rule policy' of no-discounting, i.e., p = 0  in (D.1). Point Poo, where the 
L R P C  goes through a peak in a level curve, represents the 'purely myopic 
policy', i.e., p = o o  in (D.1). This is the point which according to Nordhaus 
(1975, pp. 178-179) will be chosen by a democratic government 'under conditions 
where voting is an appropriate mechanism for social choice'. The actual 
welfare maximizer Pp, 0 < p <  ~ ,  lies somewhere between Po and P~ on the 
LRPC.  Nordhaus uses the position of Pp relative to P® to draw his basic 
welfare principle about  business cycles. 





We will show that a long-run equilibrium path (LREP) can lie on the 
opposite side of Pp than P~o does and that this LREP can have more welfare 
at each point on the path than the steady state 'welfare-maximizer' Pp does. 
We will use Nordhaus'  formulation; in it, 
Poe 
i.e., Poe lies on the u(0)-line. Let (u(t),v(t)) be a LREP, O<t<O. By (A.3) and 
(B.2), 
u(0)=~-~lfl, u (0)=(2~l f l+B/A)e-A°-B/A,  (D.2) 
v(0)=v(0) 
=(1/(1 - A)) {0t o + a~(B/A) +~(~t2fly2/A)(k((A + y(1 - 2))0)/k(y(1 - 2)0)) 
where k(x) =- (1 - e-  X)/x, still. 
Note that as 0~0 ,  
(D.3) 
(u(O),v(O))--,P~ and (u(O),v(O))--,Poo. 
Now fix all the parameters except 0. We want to trace out the locus of the 
(u(0),v(0)) endpoints of our LREP as 0 increases from 0. This locus slopes 
downward and to the fight with a non-zero derivative; for, by (D.2), 
(d/d0)u(0)[0 = o = (21~tlfl + B / A ) ( -  A)= 2!~1fl72 > 0, 
and by (D.3), 
(d/dO)(v(O))lo = o = ~(at2fly2/(1 - 2))(k'(O)/k(O)) < 0, 
since k(0)= 1 and k'(0)=-½. 
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Since the t angen t  to  the  level  set of  g is ho r i zon ta l  at  P ~ ,  
g(u(O),~O))>g(P~o) for  0 s m a l l .  
Fo r  such 0, 
g(u(t),v(t))>g(Poo) for  O<_t<_O, 
because the  L R E P  is u - s h a p e d  and  g is concave.  As p--,oo, Pe"*Poo. 
Therefore,  for p big  e n o u g h  a n d  0 small  enough ,  the welfare at each po in t  
a long the  L R E P  will exceed  the  welfare  at  the  s teady state Pp. 
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